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Abstract	  This	   paper	   claims	   that	   the	   2011	   Italian	   referendum	   on	   nuclear	   power	   is	   taking	   shape	   as	   a	  clean	   laboratory	   for	   the	  measurement	  of	   one	  of	   the	  main	   aspects	  of	   the	  NIMBY	   (Not	   In	  My	  BackYard)	  issue.	  Since	  the	  citizens	  voted	  on	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  government	  to	  set	  up	  new	  nuclear	   plants	   in	   well-­‐known	   sites,	   we	   identify	   community	   preferences	   for	   their	   locations	  across	   Italian	   municipalities	   using	   the	   turnout	   rate.	   The	   Fukushima	   nuclear	   disaster	   that	  happened	  a	  few	  months	  before	  the	  referendum	  may	  have	  magnified	  negative	  attitudes	  toward	  nuclear	  power.	   	  Thus,	   taking	   into	  account	   regional	  and	  political	   features	   that	  may	   influence	  ideological	   aversion	   to	   nuclear	   power,	   we	   still	   find	   highly	   negative	   correlation	   between	  distance	  from	  nuclear	  sites	  and	  the	  turnout	  rate.	  KEYWORDS:	  NIMBY,	  referendum,	  nuclear	  risk,	  distance	  JEL	  Codes:	  D72,	  H41,	  Q48	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  The	  1987	   referendum3,	   influenced	  by	   the	  Chernobyl	   disaster,	   led	   Italy	   to	  permanently	   shut	  down	   its	   nuclear	   power	   plants	   in	   1990.	   Two	   decades	   later,	   in	   2008,	   Italian	   government	  announced	  its	  intentions	  to	  erect	  new	  reactors	  by	  2013	  to	  reduce	  its	  dependence	  on	  imported	  energy.	  Soon	  after,	  a	  second	  referendum	  (held	  on	  the	  12-­‐13	  June	  2011)	  has	  swept	  away	  this	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  giving	  ‘the	  people’	  a	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  between	  elections,	  to	  have	  their	  say	  on	  important	  matters	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  affect	  their	  lives.	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possibility	  confirming	  an	  indefinite	  ban	  on	  the	  nuclear	  energy	  option.	  Although	  one	  needs	  to	  proceed	  warily	  in	  documenting	  choices	  about	  the	  placement	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  the	  last	  referendum	  appears	  to	  be	  another	  case	  of	  ‘‘Not	  In	  My	  Back	  Yard’’	  (NIMBY).	  In	  its	  most	  general	  and	  widespread	  meaning,	   it	  entails	  a	  resolute	  opposition	  by	  residents	   to	  new	  plans	  close	   to	  their	  homes.	   In	  Italy	  the	  nuclear	  option	  has	   involved	  a	   long	  public	  debate	  on	  environmental	  management,	   risk	   awareness	   and	  mobilization	   of	   local	   communities	   determined	   to	   defend	  their	   own	   territory.	   What	   is	   the	   key	   rationale	   for	   the	   Italian	   voters’	   continual	   rejection	   of	  proposals	  to	  build	  atomic	  power	  plants?	  The	   fear	   of	   a	   nuclear	   disaster	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   public’s	   natural	   feeling	   especially	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  grievous	  occurrence	  in	  Japan,	  along	  with	  the	  conditional	  dread	  of	  losing	  their	  current	   quality-­‐of-­‐life	   status	   and	   their	   social	   property	   value.	   In	   Italy	   this	   ‘overreaction’	   has	  brought	  in	  an	  anti-­‐nuclear	  verdict	  with	  more	  than	  95%	  of	  answers	  among	  the	  participants	  at	  the	  referendum4.	  The	  map	  of	  Italy	  (Figure	  1)	  provides	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  locations	  of	  nuclear	  reactors	  already	  operational	  since	  1987	  and	  shut	  down	  by	  1990,	  and	  the	  location	  of	  those	  that	  would	  have	  been	  built	  in	  2013	  upon	  referendum	  approval5.	  From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   social	   theories	   in	   this	   field	   (see	   e.g.	  Wolsink,	   1994;	   Fischer,	   1995),	  people’s	  appreciation	  for	  the	  advantages	  derived	  from	  nuclear	  facilities	  is	  confirmed	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  not	  located	  near	  their	  place	  of	  residence.	  Kuhn	  (1998)	  for	  instance	  verifies	  a	  positive	  relationship	   between	   facility	   acceptability,	   risk	   perception,	   and	   distance	   from	   the	   place	   of	  residence	  among	  the	  supporters	  of	  a	  nuclear-­‐fuel	  waste	  disposal	  plant	  in	  Canada.	  Lober	  and	  Green	  (1994)	  and	  Lober	   (1995)	  measure	   the	  aversion	   towards	  siting	  waste	  disposal	  plants.	  They	   discover	   that	   proximity	   to	   a	   proposed	   facility	   will	   affect	   support	   or	   opposition	   to	   it	  depending	  upon	  the	  type	  of	  facilities	  at	  issue	  and	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  them.	  Hampton	  (1996)	  in	  particular	  measures	  the	  local	  resistance	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  series	  of	  munitions’	  depots	   (as	  high	  risk	   facilities)	   in	  Australia.	  He	  shows	   that	  contrary	   to	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  In	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  the	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  referendum	  requires	  a	  minimum	  threshold	  (quorum)	  of	  more	  than	  half	  the	  electorate	   to	   vote	   to	   be	   binding,	   see	   Herrera	   and	  Mattozzi	   (2010)	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   participation	  quorum	  in	  the	  turnout	  rate.	  5	  Plants	  that	  have	  been	  shut	  off	  after	  nuclear	  referendum	  in	  1987	  are	  Caorso,	  Trino	  Vercellese,	  Latina	  and	   Garigliano.	   The	   list	   of	   the	   new	   potential	   locations	   (beside	   the	   previous	   ones)	   is:	   Chioggia,	  Monfalcone,	  San	  Benedetto	  del	  Tronto,	  Mola	  di	  Bari,	  Scanzano	  Jonico,	  Palma	  di	  Montichiaro,	  Oristano,	  Borgo	   Sabotino	   and	   Scarlino.	   It	   is	   proper	   to	   point	   out	   that	   the	   diffusion	   and	   circulation	   of	   the	  prospective	  nuclear	  sites	  comes	  from	  a	  circumstantial	  report	  brought	  out	  by	  the	  Italian	  Federation	  of	  the	  Greens	  during	  the	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  referendum.	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what	   expected,	   residents	   living	   in	   close	   proximity	   did	   not	   perceive	   higher	   risk	   of	   damage	  compared	  to	  the	  residents	  of	  other	  areas.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  waste	  incineration,	  Hunter	  and	  Leyden	  (1995)	   observe	   that	   NIMBY	   attitude	   is	   more	   related	   to	   anxiety	   for	   generic	   health	  consequences	  rather	  than	  to	  property	  values.	  As	  suggested	  by	  Shen	  and	  Yu	  (1997),	  Feinerman	  
et	  al.	  (2004),	  however,	  motivation	  of	  public	  opposition	  may	  reflect	  a	  rational	  response	  by	  the	  communities	  who	  perceive	  an	  imbalance	  between	  the	  benefits	  they	  will	  receive	  from	  hosting	  a	  plant	  (e.g.	  new	  recruitments	  and	  tax	  concession),	  and	  the	  costs	  they	  will	  bear,	  such	  as	  lower	  property	   values	   and	   potential	   health	   and	   environmental	   risks	   or	   undefined	  moral	   values6.	  Frey	   et	   al.	   (1996)	   observe	   that	   an	   adequate	   balance	   of	   costs	   and	   benefits	   characterized	   by	  cycles	   of	  monetary	   compensation	   to	   be	   received	  by	   the	   communities	   can	   lead	   to	   a	   political	  process	  in	  order	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  host	  communities7.	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  last	  referendum	  response,	  in	  this	  study,	  we	  aim	  to	  assess	  the	  community	  preferences	  for	  the	  location	  of	  new	  nuclear	  plants.	  In	  particular,	  we	  try	  to	  gauge	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  turnout	  rate	   in	  proximity	  to	  prospective	  nuclear	  plants	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  a	  NIMBY	  clout.8	  Thus,	  we	  intend	  to	  observe	  whether	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  residents	  who	  live	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  nuclear	   reactors	   have	   been	   in	   favour	   of	   repealing	   the	   law	   on	   ‘planning	   the	   realizations	   of	  nuclear	  reactors	  in	  Italy’9.	  	  	  Using	  referendum	  data	  help	  us	  measuring	  the	  effect	  of	  distance	  from	  nuclear	  sites	  on	  people’s	  choices,	  since	  other	  quoted	  evidence	  are	  based	  on	  surveys	  in	  which	  “minimal	  safe	  distances”	  from	  hypothetical	  dangerous	   facilities	   are	  gathered	   from	  community	  questionnaires.	  We	  do	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  They	  conjecture	  on	  a	  democratic	  political	  process	  among	  individuals	  able	  to	  solve	  the	  NIMBY	  conflict	  under	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  well-­‐defined	  political	  equilibrium.	  	  	  	  7	  Frey	  and	  Oberholzer-­‐Gee	  (1997)	  measure	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  using	  price	  incentives	  in	  real-­‐life	  issues	   (like	   the	   siting	   of	   locally	   unwanted	   projects)	   where	   individual’s	   sense	   of	   civic	   duty	   assumes	  heavily	  a	  crucial	  role.	  	  8	  Note	  that	  referendum	  ‘proponents’	  referred	  in	  the	  popular	  media	  and	  electoral	  drive	  to	  widespread	  general	   support	   about	   the	   proposal	   along	   all	   Italian	   regions	   (independently	   by	   the	   distance	   from	  nuclear	  reactors)	  due	  to	  the	  necessity	  to	  form	  the	  quorum.	  9	  We	   feel	   quite	   safe	   in	   assuming	   that	   the	   only	   variable	   at	   play	   is	   distance,	   since	   no	   structured	   and	  detailed	   compensation	   plans	   have	   been	   associated	   to	   the	   decision	   of	   building	   new	   nuclear	   plants.	  However,	  we	  have	  information	  on	  a	  compensation	  plan	  (Resolution	  n.	  111/2008,	  GU	  n.	  70	  25-­‐3-­‐2009)	  for	  municipalities	   and	   provinces	   hosting	   the	   four	   existing	   nuclear	   plants	   and	   other	   nuclear-­‐related	  facilities,	   so	   we	   also	   do	   an	   exercise	   of	   controlling	   for	   possible	   economic	   benefits	   coming	   from	   the	  location	  of	  plants.	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not	   aim	   at	   disentangling	   the	   (possibly	   endogenous)	   bias	   in	   voting	   pattern	   introduced	   by	  organizations	  backing	  or	  supporting	  nuclear	  power	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  regional	  (or	  provincial)	   fixed	   effects	   take	   into	   account	   all	   the	   differential	   local	   involvement	   of	  organizations	   uncorrelated	   with	   distance.	   Second,	   since	   the	   rise	   of	   endogenous	   forces	   is	  unavoidable	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  policy	  interventions,	  the	  interesting	  elasticity	  for	  policy	  analysis	  is	  the	  overall	  effect.	  	  	  	  
2.	  Institutional	  Background	  	  The	   so-­‐called	   popular	   referendum	   is	   one	   of	   the	   two	   forms	   of	   legally	   binding	   democratic	  devices	   provided	   for	   by	   the	   Italian	   Constitution	   (art.	   75)	   to	   involve	   people’	   choice	   into	   the	  public	  decision	  process10.	  It	  can	  be	  proclaimed	  at	  the	  request	  of	  five	  regional	  councils	  or	  the	  collection	  of	  500000	  signatures	  of	  eligible	  voters	  signing	  a	  public	  validated	  petition	  and	  only	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  on	  whether	  to	  repeal	  an	  existing	  law.	  For	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  referendum	  in	  Italy	  to	  be	  binding,	  turnout	  must	  be	  above	  50%.	  For	  what	  involves	  our	  analysis,	  few	  months	  ago,	   balloting	   ended	   in	   a	   two-­‐day	   referendum	   (on	   the	   12-­‐13	   June	   2011)	   with	   a	   clear-­‐cut	  response	   on	   nuclear	   power.	   Almost	   95%	   of	   Italian	   voters	   have	   rejected	   a	   law	   passed	   by	  government	  that	  aimed	  to	  restart	  Italy's	  nuclear	  energy	  plan,	  stalled	  for	  more	  than	  20	  years.	  Indeed	   Italy’s	   nuclear	   industry	   was	   dismantled	   after	   votes	   in	   three	   referenda	   in	   1987.	  Historically,	   this	  was	   the	  prelude	  of	   an	   anti-­‐nuclear	   campaign	  guided	  by	   the	   environmental	  movement,	  which	  became	  a	  formidable	  social	  movement	  in	  Italy	  during	  the	  1980s.	  The	  1987	  referenda	  votes	  against	  nuclear	  power	  also	  came	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  Chernobyl	  nuclear	  accident	   in	  Ukraine	   in	  1986.	  Afterwards	  a	  change	  in	  government	  policy	   in	  2008	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  plans	  for	  a	  program	  of	  nuclear	  construction	  to	  reduce	  the	  country's	  dependence	  on	  oil,	  gas	  and	   imported	  power11.	  Legislation	  was	  passed	   in	   the	  same	  year	   to	  guarantee	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  alternative	  mechanism	  i.e.	  the	  constitutional	  referendum	  (art.	  138)	  can	  be	  only	  called	  in	  order	  to	  decide	   on	   whether	   to	   approve	   a	   constitutional	   law	   or	   amendment	   passed	   through	   both	   legislative	  Houses	  of	  the	  Italian	  Parliament	  with	  a	  majority	  of	   less	   than	  two	  thirds	  in	  both	  or	  either	  Chamber.	  It	  can	  be	  called	  only	  at	  the	  request	  of	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  members	  of	  either	  House,	  or	  five	  regional	  councils,	  or	  500.000	  electors.	  	  11	  Restarting	  nuclear	  plants	  was	  one	  of	  the	  key	  promises	  of	  the	  Centre-­‐Right	  government	  when	  it	  was	  elected	  in	  2008.	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construction	   of	   nuclear	   power	   plants	   while	   economic	   agreements	   have	   been	   signed	   with	  energy	  companies	   to	  build	  at	   least	   four	  new	  nuclear	  plants	   from	  2013.	   In	   few	  months	   fears	  about	   nuclear	   power	   have	   increased	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   nuclear	   referendum	   on	   June	  following	  the	  accident	  at	  the	  Fukushima	  nuclear	  plant,	  caused	  by	  a	  tsunami	  the	  11th	  of	  March	  2011.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Japanese	  disaster,	  it	  was	  not,	  therefore,	  startling	  that	  Italian	  Citizens	  voted	  to	  throw	  the	  proposal	  out12.	  Thus,	  what	  was	  surprising	  for	  us	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  size	  of	  the	  majority	   (95%)	   or	   the	   relatively	   high	   turnout	   of	   57%,	   one	   of	   the	   highest	   in	   any	   Italian	  referendum	  for	  over	  a	  decade	  but	  rather	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  turnout	  rate	  in	  proximity	  to	  a	  potential	  nuclear	  plants	  which	  implicitly	  suggests	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  the	  NIMBY	  clout	  was	  in	  place13,14.	  For	  what	  we	  know	  this	   is	   the	   first	   investigation	  on	  referenda	   case	  study	  where	  public	   risk	   perceptions	   result	   in	   Not-­‐in-­‐my-­‐backyard	   policy	   process	   to	   screeching	   halts.	   As	  suggested	   by	   Hermansson	   (2007),	   when	   faced	   with	   an	   increase	   in	   risky	   prospects,	   the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  decision	  process	  and	  its	  related	  perception	  costs	  is	  contingent	  upon	  an	  actual	  harmful	   occurrence	   at	   later	   date	   and	   is	   not	   simply	   amenable	   to	   insurance	   schemes.	   The	  analysis	   in	  this	  paper	  sheds	   light	  on	  an	   interesting	  area	  of	   the	  NIMBY	  syndrome	  relevant	  to	  measuring	  risk	  perception	  impact	  and	  idiosyncratic	  aversion	  on	  nuclear	  plants	  characterized	  by	   the	   strong	   negative	   correlation	   between	   the	   turnout	   rate	   and	   the	   distance	   of	  municipalities.	  Relating	  to	  concerns	  about	  health,	  safety	  and	  environmental	  welfare15,	  in	  this	  case	   community	   preferences	   are	   definitively	   expressed	   with	   higher	   turnout	   rate	   by	   local	  residents	  closest	  to	  potentially	  hazardous	  sites.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Moreover	  at	   the	   time	  of	   referendum	  in	   Italy,	   the	   Japanese	  catastrophe	  has	  already	   forced	  German	  government	  into	  a	  U-­‐turn	  on	  nuclear	  power.	  In	  particular,	  Germany’	  choice	  to	  abandon	  nuclear	  energy	  over	  the	  next	  11	  years	  was	  making	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  public	  opinion	  in	  Italy.	  13	  It	  is	  worth	  to	  note	  that	  due	  to	  the	  incentives	  relied	  on	  nuclear	  power	  and	  its	  potential	  NIMBY	  impact	  on	   the	  distance	  of	   residents’	  dwellings	   from	  the	  proposed	  sites,	   the	  same	  voters	  also	  rejected	  other,	  very	   different	   laws	   in	   three	   further	   referenda.	   Two	   of	   them	   dealt	   with	  water	   privatization.	   A	   third	  concerned	  a	  law	  allowing	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  his	  cabinet	  to	  avoid	  court	  appearances	  (immunity	  from	  trial)	  by	  citing	  government	  business	  as	  a	  reason.	  14	   Government	   instead	   of	   fighting	   for	   the	   legislation	   on	   its	   merits,	   have	   tried	   to	   deter	   voters	   from	  participating	  plus	  an	  attempt	  to	  block	  the	  vote	  failed	  in	  the	  courts	  a	  few	  days	  before	  polling.	  15	   Schively	   (2007)	   and	   Rabe	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   discover	   that	   the	   perceptions	   of	   the	   affected	   residents	  concerning	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  the	  site,	  trust	  for	  the	  groups	  involved,	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  process	  of	  site	  selection	  are	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  related	  to	  the	  NIMBY	  overreaction.	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3.	  Data	  and	  Results	  	  We	  use	  data	  about	  the	  referendum	  held	  on	  12-­‐13	  June	  2011	  for	  most	  of	  Italian	  municipalities	  (8068	  out	  of	  8094)16.	  In	  particular	  the	  nature	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  dataset	  allow	  us	  to	  directly	  estimate	  the	  effect	  of	  distance	  on	  people’s	  choices.	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  the	  usual	  way	  of	  assessing	  people’s	   attitudes	   toward	   facilities	   is	   through	   surveys	   targeted	  at	  people	   living	   in	  the	   nearby	   of	   potential	   sites.	   Information	   about	   the	   number	   of	   residents	   and	   the	   entitled	  voters,	   the	   turnout,	   the	   share	   of	   YES	   and	   NO	   voters	   along	   with	   blank,	   null	   and	   contested	  ballots	  are	  also	  gathered.	   	  In	  particular	  56.69%	  of	  extensive	  polling	  voted	  at	  the	  referendum	  on	  nuclear	  option,	  while	  the	  YES	  voters	  were	  more	  than	  94%	  among	  participants.	  We	  develop	  a	  series	  of	  ‘great-­‐circle’	  distances	  from	  expected	  nuclear	  sites	  for	  each	  municipality	  examined	  and	  then	  a	  minimum	  distance	  as	  our	  main	  explanatory	  variable.	  The	  minimum	  distance	  points	  to	  a	  mean	  of	  80.5	  kilometres,	  a	  standard	  deviation	  of	  40.2	  and	  a	  median	  at	  76.2.	  Since	  the	  only	  component	  in	  voting	  preference	  is	  the	  negative	  impact	  on	  living	  close	  to	  a	  nuclear	  structure,	  our	   main	   prediction	   suggests	   that	   areas	   in	   proximity	   to	   the	   new	   expected	   sites	   should	  experience	   higher	   turnout	   rates.	   We	   report	   in	   table	   1	   different	   specifications	   of	   a	   linear	  regression	  model	   in	   which	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is,	   in	   all	   but	   one	   case,	   the	   turnout	   rate	  while	  the	  main	  explanatory	  variable	   is	   the	  minimum	  distance	  from	  nuclear	  sites.	   In	   figure	  2	  we	  report	  a	  map	  depicting	  the	  distance	  from	  new	  nuclear	  plants	  where	  area	  gets	  darker	  with	  the	  distance	  from	  plants.	  All	  models	  are	  fitted	  by	  Ordinary	  Least	  Square	  (OLS	  hereafter),	  with	  standard	  errors	  robust	  to	  heteroscedasticity.	  The	  basic	  regression	  (Column	  1)	  includes	  only	  a	  constant	   term	  and	   the	  distance,	   the	   latter	   showing	  a	  negative	   and	   significant	   coefficient	   (at	  5%	   confidence	   level).	   The	   magnitude	   (-­‐0.0055)	   indicates	   that	   augmenting	   the	   distance	  between	  a	  municipality	  and	  the	  closer	  nuclear	  site	  by	  40	  kilometres	  (one	  standard	  deviation)	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  turnout	  of	  more	  than	  0.2%.	  In	  Column	  2,	  instead,	  we	  control	  for	  20	  regional	  dummies,	   thus	  only	   the	  within-­‐region	   variation	  of	  distance	  measures	   the	   impact	  of	  turnout.	   The	   explanatory	   power	   of	   the	   regression	   increases,	   while	   the	   coefficient	   about	  distance	  is	  unchanged.	  Column	  3	  includes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  political	  coalitions,	  grouping	  regions,	  by	   means	   of	   dummy	   variables,	   run	   by	   Centre-­‐Right,17	   Centre-­‐Left	   and	   Northern	   League	  administrations	   where	   the	   baseline	   is	   Trentino	   Alto-­‐Adige,	   a	   region	   governed	   by	   a	   local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Official	  data	  come	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Internal	  Affairs.	  17	  This	  coalition	  was	  aligned	  with	  the	  central	  government	  that	  put	  pressure	  on	  its	  electorate	  to	  keep	  turnout	  low	  and	  appealed	  to	  the	  courts	  for	  the	  vote	  to	  be	  declared	  illegal.	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coalition	  where	  the	  turnout	  was	  at	  a	  maximum.	  As	  expected,	   the	  turnout	  within	  the	  regions	  politically	  aligned	  with	  the	  central	  government18	  is	  more	  than	  10%	  lower	  than	  the	  one	  on	  the	  baseline,	  while	   in	   regions	   run	  by	   Centre-­‐Left	   administrations	   the	   drop	   is	   about	   6.5%.	  After	  controlling	   for	   regional	   political	   alignment	   with	   central	   government,	   the	   coefficient	   of	  distance	   increases	   (now	   significant	   at	   the	   1%	   level)	   and	   implies	   a	   reduction	   of	   0.85%	  standard	  deviation	  from	  the	  closer	  nuclear	  plant.	  Further	  exploring	  the	  political	  determinants	  of	   turnout,	   especially	   to	   control	   for	   the	   possible	   discrepancy	   between	   actual	   and	  perceived	  risk	   driven	   by	   local	   institutional	   aversion	   to,	   or	   preference	   for,	   nuclear	   power,	   we	   add	   to	  specification	  of	  Column	  2	  a	  set	  of	  four	  dummies	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  affiliation	  of	  each	  municipality’s	  mayor,	   i.e.	   the	   four	   dummies	   representing	   respectively,	   Centre	   coalition	   (61	  observations),	   Centre-­‐Left	   one	   (677),	   Centre-­‐Right	   one	   (873),	   Autonomists	   (104)	   with	  Municipal	   party	   Lists	   as	   the	   baseline.19	   Results	   in	   Column	   4	   show	   that	   the	   coefficient	   of	  distance	  is	  slightly	  larger	  and	  more	  precisely	  estimated,	  while	  three	  out	  of	  four	  coefficients	  of	  political	  dummies	  have	  the	  expected	  significant	  sign.	   In	  Column	  5	  the	  dependent	  variable	   is	  the	  share	  of	  YES	  voters.	  Note	  that	  the	  ‘distance’	  index	  is	  now	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  suggesting	  that	  the	  relevant	  issue	  at	  the	  referendum	  was	  the	  threshold	  between	  voters	  versus	  abstentions,	  rather	  than	  the	  ‘YES’	  and	  ‘NO’	  shares	  of	  active	  electorate.	  Figures	  3	  and	  4	  draw	  respectively	  the	  entire	  profile	  of	  the	  share	  of	  YES	  voters	  and	  the	  turnout	  rate.	  We	  may	  point	  out	  that	  the	  first	  distribution	  is	  definitively	  right-­‐skewed	  while	  the	  second	  one	  seems	  to	  be	  normally	  distributed.20	  As	  discussed,	  the	  turnout	  rate	  emerges	  as	  the	  key	  decision	  variable	  to	   look	   at	   in	   order	   to	   gather	   information	   on	   people’s	   preferences.	   Moreover,	   instead	   of	  exploiting	   twenty	   regional	   dummies,	   we	   opt	   for	   a	   finer	   analysis	   and	   use	   103	   provincial	  dummies	  (Column	  6),	  improving	  on	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  regression	  (with	  respect	  to	  Column	  2,	  R-­‐squared	  increases	  by	  0.11).	  The	  specification	  in	  Column	  7	  takes	  into	  account	  that	  for	   some	   municipalities,	   i.e.	   those	   already	   close	   to	   the	   four	   existing	   nuclear	   plants,	   the	  possibility	  of	  building	  new	  nuclear	  plants	  would	  not	  have	  any	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  risk.	  Thus	  we	  construct	  a	  new	  variable	  based	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  ‘minimal	  distance’	  (in	  terms	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   The	   regions	   controlled	   by	   Northern	   League,	   partner	   in	   the	   central	   government	   coalition	   but	   in	  favour	  of	  the	  referendum,	  show	  a	  drop	  smaller	  than	  8%.	  	  	  19	  With	  data	  aggregated	  at	  municipal	   level	  we	  cannot	  do	  better	  in	  evaluating	  the	  perceived	  vs.	  actual	  risk,	  as	  for	  example	  Groothuis	  and	  Miller	  (1997)	  do	  using	  individual	  data.	  20	   Note	   that	   a	   test	   for	   normality	   on	   the	   rate	   of	   turnover	   rejects	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   non-­‐normal	  distribution.	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kilometres)	   between	   the	   existing	   and	   the	   new	   potential	   plants21.	   Figure	   5	   reports	   this	  variable:	   darker	   areas	   identify	   municipalities	   that	   experienced	   larger	   reduction	   in	   this	  difference.	  Note	  that	  Sicily,	  Sardinia	  and	  the	  Northeast	  regions	  would	  have	  been	  severely	  hit	  by	   the	   placing	   of	   new	   reactors,	  while	  most	   of	  Northwestern	  municipalities	  would	   have	   not	  changed	  their	  risk	  status.	  Approximately,	  half	  of	  the	  municipalities	  experience	  a	  zero	  (median	  is	   below	   2	   kilometres),	   while	   the	  mean	   and	   standard	   deviation	   of	   differential	   distance	   are	  around	  73	  and	  104,	  respectively.	   In	  this	  case	  the	  coefficient	   is	  positive	  (0.0201)	  as	  expected	  and	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level,	  suggesting	  that	  those	  municipalities	  for	  which	  risk	  would	  have	  increased	  are	  those	  that	  reacted	  with	  a	  higher	  turnout	  rate.	  As	  a	  final	  point,	  in	  Column	  8	  we	  relax	  the	  linearity	  assumption	  building	  dummies	  for	  different	  distance	  bins:	  less	  than	  10	  km,	  between	  10	  and	  20,	  between	  20	  and	  50	  and	  between	  50	  and	  10022.	  All	  dummies	  have	  positive	  coefficients;	  the	  first	  (the	  largest	  one)	  and	  the	  fourth	  are	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   results	   hold	   even	   after	   controlling	   for	   provincial	   fixed	   effects,	   for	   ideological	  reasons	  and	  when	  we	  focus	  also	  on	  the	  previous	  nuclear	  experience	  of	  municipalities.	  What	  emerges	  from	  the	  results	  of	  the	  repealing	  referendum	  of	  2011	  on	  nuclear	  power	  is	  the	  highly	  observed	   negative	   relation	   between	   distance	   from	   (planned)	   nuclear	   sites	   and	   the	   turnout,	  validating	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  NIMBY	  effect	  in	  Italy.	  Further	   we	   test	   several	   competing	   hypothesis	   concerning	   the	   proxy	   of	   NIMBY	   reaction,	  including	   demographics,	   proximity	   and	   partisanship.	   Further	   remarks	   are	   emphasized	   in	  table	  2	  where	  we	  propose	  some	  other	  regressions	  confirming	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  results.	  In	  Column	  1	  we	  use	   the	   logarithm	  of	   distance	   so	   that	   the	   coefficient	   represents	   the	   change	   in	  turnout	  for	  a	  1%	  variation	  in	  distance.	  The	  estimated	  coefficient,	  now	  interpreted	  as	  elasticity,	  is	  -­‐0.3	  and	  it	  is	  significant	  at	  5%	  level.	  In	  Column	  2	  we	  replicate	  the	  same	  specification	  from	  table	  1,	  that	  is	  the	  regression	  with	  distance	  and	  regional	  dummies,	  but	  instead	  of	  using	  robust	  standard	  errors	  we	  weight	  each	  observation	  for	  the	  number	  of	  electors	  in	  each	  municipality	  in	  order	   to	   interpret	   the	   results	   in	   terms	  of	   individuals	   rather	   than	  municipalities.	  Results	  are	  very	  similar	  in	  magnitude	  and	  even	  more	  significant.	  In	  Column	  3	  we	  restrict	  the	  analysis	  to	  those	  municipalities	  that	  experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  risk	  status,	  i.e.	  the	  distance	  from	  the	  closer	  nuclear	  plant	  would	  have	  diminished.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  distance	  is	  larger	  in	  magnitude	  (-­‐0.0227)	  and	  significant	  at	  1%	  level,	  indicating	  that	  these	  are	  identified	  as	  the	  municipalities	  whose	  choices	  are	  more	  influenced	  by	  the	  potential	  implementation	  of	  nuclear	  plants.	  Again	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Remember	  that	  the	  four	  existing	  sites	  are	  also	  enclosed	  in	  the	  list	  of	  the	  new	  ones.	  22	  The	  baseline	  case	  involves	  the	  municipalities’	  distant	  more	  than	  100	  kilometres.	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on	   the	   whole	   sample,	   in	   column	   4	   we	   control	   for	   the	   (log	   of)	   population	   (and	   regional	  dummies)	  taking	  into	  account	  scale	  effects	  in	  turnout	  rate.	  As	  expected,	  larger	  municipalities	  show	  higher	   turnout,	  while	   distance	   is	   still	   negative	   and	   significant,	   although	   at	   10%	   level.	  Once	  we	   split	   the	   sample	   between	  municipalities	   smaller	   and	   larger	   than	   5000	   inhabitants	  (Column	  5	  and	  6,	   respectively),	  we	   find	   that	  distance	  has	  an	  effect	  on	   turnout	  only	   in	  small	  municipalities.	   Compared	   to	   the	   high	   turnout	   obtained	   in	   larger	  municipalities,	   this	   finding	  could	   be	   a	   signal	   that	   the	   NIMBY	   effect	   is	   strongly	   felt	   in	   places	   where	   the	   importance	   of	  environment	  is	  a	  valuable	  amenity	  and	  where	  ideological	  issues	  are	  weaker,	  as	  it	  is	  especially	  in	  small,	  rural	  municipalities.	  	  The	  popular	  view	  suggests	  that	  rather	  than	  holding	  the	  policy	  process	  hostage	  to	  perception,	  economic	   compensation	   and	   incentives	   (transfers	   and	   tax	   benefits)	   could	   be	   a	   NIMBY	  ameliorative	  device	  (Dear,	  1992;	  Mansfield	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  To	  somehow	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  compensations	   we	   add	   two	   dummies	   for	   those	   municipalities	   and	   provinces	   that	   received	  money	   transfers	   because	   of	   them	   hosting	   (dismissed)	   nuclear	   plants	   or	   nuclear-­‐related	  facilities,	  according	  to	  the	  Resolution	  n.	  111/2008,	  GU	  n.	  70	  25-­‐3-­‐2009,	  by	  the	  Italian	  Inter-­‐ministerial	   Committee	   for	   Economic	   Planning.23	   The	   results,	   in	   column	   7,	   show	   that	   the	  turnout	   rate	   was	   2.3%	   lower	   in	   provinces	   that	   received	   compensations,	   suggesting	   that	  monetary	  compensations	  could	  be	  a	  way	  to	  reduce	  the	  NIMBY	  effect.	  However,	  the	  impact	  of	  distance	  is	  now	  larger	  in	  magnitude	  (-­‐0.0097)	  and	  more	  precisely	  estimated	  (1%	  significance	  level)	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  baseline	  results	  of	  Table	  1,	  column	  2.	  
	  
4.	  Conclusions	  Exploiting	   information	   about	   the	   2011	   Italian	   referendum	   on	   nuclear	   power	   our	   analysis	  sought	   out	   how	   local	  NIMBY-­‐ism	   can	   crush	   nuclear	   power	   projects.	   In	   particular	  we	   try	   to	  gauge	   to	  what	  extent	  distance	  plays	  a	   role	   in	  people’s	  aversion	   to	   the	   instalment	  of	  nuclear	  potential	   plants.	   This	   constitutes	   an	   important	   dimension	   in	   policies,	   which	   aim	   at	   solving	  NIMBY	   issues.	  Due	  to	   the	  nature	  of	  data	  and	  to	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  well-­‐defined	  compensation	  policy	  for	  the	  municipalities	  close	  to	  the	  potential	  nuclear	  plants,	  we	  claim	  that	  our	  estimates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  fact	  that	  compensations	  were	  related	  to	  the	  old	  nuclear	  plants	  makes	  us	  cautious	  in	  interpreting	  the	   results,	   since	   the	   criteria	   used	   to	   design	   compensations	   did	   not	   took	   into	   account	   the	   expected	  location	  of	  new	  power	  plants.	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do	   not	   suffer	   from	   severe	   biases.	   We	   find	   that	   augmenting	   the	   distance	   between	   a	  municipality	  and	  the	  closer	  nuclear	  site	  by	  40	  kilometres	   leads	   to	  a	  decrease	   in	   the	   turnout	  (the	   key	   margin	   in	   the	   Italian	   referenda-­‐system)	   of	   more	   than	   0.2%	   in	   the	   more	   cautious	  estimation,	   while	   the	   decrease	   in	   turnout	   can	   be	   up	   to	   1%	   once	   we	   consider	   only	   those	  municipalities	   that,	  with	   the	   instalment	   of	   new	   nuclear	   plants,	  would	   have	   laid	   themselves	  open	  to	  increasing	  risk.	  Political	  alignment	  of	  municipal	  and	  regional	  institutions	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  turnout,	  but	  still	  distance	  significantly	  matters	  among	  turnout’s	  determinants.	  Results	   are	   also	   robust	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	   regional	   or	   provincial	   fixed	   effects,	   as	   well	   as	  different	  specification	  of	  distance,	  while,	   it	  turns	  out	  that	  although	  larger	  municipalities	  tent	  to	   show	   up	  more	   at	   the	   referendum,	   the	   effect	   of	   distance	   on	   turnout	   is	  more	   localized	   in	  smaller	  municipalities.	  
	  
	  
















	   	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Results	  for	  regression	  analysis	   	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
Dep.Var.	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Share	  of	  YES	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Constant	   57.1288	   58.9842	   67.1558	   58.2650	   94.2706	   62.8862	   57.1223	   58.0304	  	   [0.1916]***	   [0.6561]***	   [0.4579]***	   [0.6344]***	   [0.1569]***	   [2.0637]***	   [0.5947]***	   [0.6006]***	  Distance	   -­‐0.0055	   -­‐0.0059	   -­‐0.0209	   -­‐0.0070	   0.0003	   -­‐0.0101	   	   	  	   [0.0024]**	   [0.0025]**	   [0.0022]***	   [0.0025]***	   [0.0007]	   [0.0050]**	   	   	  Left	  Region	   	   	   -­‐6.533	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   [0.4034]***	   	   	   	   	   	  Right	  Region	   	   	   -­‐10.8233	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   [0.3842]***	   	   	   	   	   	  League	  Region	   	   	   -­‐7.8562	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   [0.4117]***	   	   	   	   	   	  Center	  Munic.	   	   	   	   0.1875	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   [0.8346]	   	   	   	   	  Center-­‐Right	  Munic.	   	   	   	   -­‐1.0593	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   [0.2118]***	   	   	   	   	  Center-­‐Left	  Munic.	   	   	   	   3.5005	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   [0.2582]***	   	   	   	   	  Autonomist	  Munic.	   	   	   	   8.4250	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   [0.5819]***	   	   	   	   	  Differential	  Distance	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.0201	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [0.0021]***	   	  Distance	  <10	  Km	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1.9063	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [0.6986]***	  Distance	  10-­‐20	  Km	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.7926	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [0.4433]*	  Distance	  20-­‐50	  Km	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.1278	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [0.2593]	  Distance	  50-­‐100	  Km	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.9251	  [0.2229]***	  Dummies	   NO	   Regional	   NO	   Regional	   Regional	   Provincial	   Regional	   Regional	  Observations	   8068	   8068	   8068	   7791	   8068	   8068	   8068	   8068	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared	   0.00	   0.24	   0.12	   0.27	   0.57	   0.35	   0.25	   0.24	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  brackets	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	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Table	  2:	  Additional	  results	  from	  regression	  analysis.	  	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Dep.Var.	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	   Turnout	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Constant	   57.976	   61.4258	   59.4146	   55.4172	   63.6715	   59.7427	   59.3843	  	   [0.5669]***	   [1.2600]***	   [0.2619]***	   [0.8723]***	   [0.8702]***	   [1.6096]***	   [0.6577]***	  Distance	   	   -­‐0.0063	   -­‐0.0227	   -­‐0.0043	   -­‐0.0061	   -­‐0.0026	   -­‐0.0097***	  	   	   [0.0020]***	   [0.0030]***	   [0.0025]*	   [0.0029]**	   [0.0046]	   [0.0024]	  Log(Distance)	   -­‐0.3042	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   [0.1366]**	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Log(Inhabitants)	   	   	   	   0.4122	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   [0.0650]***	   	   	   	  Compensation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.8739	  Municipality	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [1.4928]	  Compensation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐2.3149	  Province	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [0.2722]***	  Dummies	   NO	   Regional	   NO	   Regional	   Regional	   Regional	   Regional	  Observations	   8068	   8068	   4104	   8068	   5668	   2400	   8068	  Adjusted	  R-­‐squared	   0.00	   0.39	   0.02	   0.24	   0.21	   0.37	   0.24	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  brackets	  (Standard	  errors	  in	  Column	  2).	  In	  Column	  2	  observations	  are	  
weighted	  using	  the	  number	  of	  electors	  per	  municipality.	  In	  Column	  5	  (6)	  the	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  
municipalities	  smaller	  (larger)	  than	  5000	  inhabitants.	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Figure	  1:	  Locations	  of	  nuclear	  reactors	  already	  working	   in	  1987	  and	  shut	  down	  by	  1990	  (red	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Figure	  2.	  A	  map	  of	  Italy	  depicting	  the	  ranges	  from	  new	  nuclear	  sites.	  Area	  gets	  darker	  with	  the	  
distance	  from	  new	  plants.	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Figure	  5.	  A	  map	  of	  Italy	  measuring	  the	  difference	  among	  distances	  between	  old	  plants	  and	  new	  
ones.	  Darker	  areas	  identify	  municipalities	  that	  experienced	  larger	  reduction	  in	  this	  difference.	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